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Abstract 
 
Harmful Digital Communications have become a pervasive and serious problem in 
New Zealand. The Harmful Digital Communications Bill aims to address this problem 
in a number of ways. This paper focuses on the civil enforcement regime and the 
criminal offence of causing harm by posting a digital communication established by 
the Bill. It considers these aspects of the Bill in light of the right to freedom of 
expression, and analyses whether they constitute a justified limitation on that right. 
By applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 section 5 analysis from Hansen 
v R, the paper discovers that the civil enforcement regime is a justified limitation, but 
the new criminal offence is not. The paper concludes that the inclusion of a public 
interest defence in the offence would allow it to effectively ameliorate the harm 
caused by online abuse without impinging on freedom of expression more than is 
reasonably necessary. 
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I  Introduction 
 
In the months leading up to her death, Charlotte Dawson had been the victim of 
sustained and vicious online abuse, and had become passionate about campaigning 
against cyber-bullying as a result. 1  In February 2014, the Australian based New 
Zealand television personality committed suicide after a well-publicised battle with 
depression, and has since become known as New Zealand’s most prominent victim of 
“cyber-bullying”.2 Charlotte’s story also serves as a reminder that online abuse is not 
simply an adolescent problem, but can be directed at and has deleterious effects on 
people of all ages.3 Friends of Charlotte’s created a petition soon after her death, 
calling for the Australian Government to implement tougher laws targeting abusive 
digital communications.4 
 
Hayley-Ann Fenton was 15 years old when she took her life by ingesting a fatal dose 
of her father’s heart medication in 2009.5 The Rotorua teenager had entered into a 
relationship with Pelesasa Tiumalu, a 27 year old man, who she met while working at 
McDonalds. After 5 months together, Pelesasa ended their relationship, and resumed 
his relationship with his estranged wife, Elina. As Pelesasa stood by and watched, 
Elina sent threatening and abusive text messages to Hayley-Ann from Pelesasa’s cell 
phone, claiming that he did not like Hayley-Ann and that he didn’t care whether she 
killed herself. 6  Later that night Hayley-Ann was discovered unconscious in her 
family’s bathroom and rushed to hospital, where the following day her parents made 
the decision to turn off her life support. Coroner Wallace Bain said the overarching 
cause of Hayley-Ann’s death was the “shocking, bullying” text messages from Elina.7 
Hayley-Ann’s death prompted calls for a law change that would deter users of digital 
communication from sending malicious content.8  
 
                                                        
1 Sam Boyer “Calls go out for ‘Charlotte’s Law’” <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
2 Colin Gavaghan “Cyber-bullying and the law” <https://blogs.otago.ac.nz>. 
3 Josh Taylor “Government has no plans for ‘Charlotte’s Law’” <www.zdnet.com>. 
4 Boyer, above n 1. 
5 Amanda Gillies “Call for cyber bullying law after death” <www.3news.co.nz>.  
6 Michael Dickison “News about abusive texts stuns parents of dead girl” <http://www.nzherald.co.nz> 
7 Abigail Hartevelt “Call for new cyber bullying laws” <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
8 Gilles, above n 5. 
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Cases such as these led Prime Minister John Key to call for a “national conversation” 
on how to reduce bullying in our schools in 2011.9 He commissioned a report on the 
challenges facing New Zealand adolescents, which considered the impact of digital 
technology and emphasized the need for the law to reflect the drastically changed 
environment in which young New Zealanders are now growing up.10 The following 
year, the Law Commission released a ministerial briefing paper entitled Harmful 
Digital Communications: The Adequacy of the Current Sanctions and Remedies (the 
ministerial briefing paper). It made recommendations for how to better incorporate 
harm through digital communications into the law.  
 
The Harmful Digital Communications Bill (the Bill) was drafted in response to the 
ministerial briefing paper’s finding that current laws do not adequately address new 
forms of harm resulting from digital communications. The Bill suggests a number of 
alterations, including establishing a new civil enforcement regime, amending existing 
law relating to communications, and creating a new criminal offence of causing harm 
by posting a digital communication.11 The Bill has been assessed by the Justice and 
Electoral Committee (the select committee), and is now awaiting its second reading.   
 
While many New Zealanders see the Bill as a positive step, there are also those who 
think it encroaches too much on freedom of expression.12 This paper considers the 
Bill in light of the right to freedom of expression, and analyses whether it constitutes 
a justified limitation on that right. The body of this paper is divided into seven parts. 
Part II considers what constitutes harmful digital communication and “cyber-
bullying”, and the injurious effects online abuse can have on victims. Part III sets out 
how the Harmful Digital Communications Bill aims to amend the law in this area. 
Part IV looks at the theoretical rationales underpinning freedom of expression, and 
assesses how the type of speech targeted by the Bill fits within those rationales. Part 
                                                        
9 New Zealand Law Commission Harmful Digital Communications: The Adequacy of the Current 
Sanctions and Remedies, (‘Harmful Digital Communications’) (Wellington, 2012) at [2]. 
10 Harmful Digital Communications, above n 9 at [6.5]. This resulted in a report from the Prime 
Minister’s Chief Science Advisor Improving the Transition: Reducing Social and Psychological 
Morbidity During Adolescence (“PMCSA Report”) (Office of the Prime Minister’s Science Advisory 
Committee, May 2011).  
11 Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2013 (168-2). 
12 Tech Liberty “Submission: Harmful Digital Communications Bill”; Google “Submission of Google 
on the Harmful Digital Communications Bill”. 
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V of the paper then considers the implications the Bill may have on the right to 
freedom of expression by applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZBORA) section 5 analysis from Hansen v R.13 Part VI compares the Bill with 
laws targeting online abuse enacted in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America, assessing whether the Bill could be further improved by 
incorporating aspects of foreign law. Finally, the paper concludes by considering how 
the Bill could best be amended to effectively ameliorate the harm caused by online 
abuse without impinging on freedom of expression more than is reasonably necessary. 
 
II Harmful Digital Communications: Scope and Effect 
 
This section discusses the prevalence of harmful digital communications, first within 
the general population, and then amongst adolescents specifically. It also considers 
the seriousness of the harm caused by these electronic abuses. 
 
The term “harmful digital communications” will be used throughout this paper to 
cover the spectrum of behaviours involving the use of digital technology to 
intentionally cause harm to another person. The term “cyber-bullying” will be 
reserved for harmful digital communications that occur within the context of 
adolescent peer relationships. 
 
A General Population 
 
1 Prevalence of harmful digital communications 
 
In a submission to the Law Commission, the New Zealand Police noted “existing and 
potential harms to the public from speech abuses are significant” and that police were 
dealing with “a growing number of complaints from members of the public who have 
been intimidated, bullied, harassed and threatened on the internet. 14  NetSafe, an 
independent non-profit organization that promotes cyber safety, submitted that on 
average it was advising 75 people each month who were dealing with some kind of 
                                                        
13Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC). 
14 Submission of New Zealand Police (March 2012) at 3, in Harmful Digital Communications, above n 
9, at [2.11]. 
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digital abuse or harassment.15 Netsafe approximated half of these cases are in relation 
to serious online abuses being perpetuated against an adult, and half relate to cyber-
bullying involving adolescents.16 To further assist in assessing the prevalence of the 
problem, the Law Commission commissioned independent research on the topic, 
interviewing 750 New Zealanders aged 18-70. Approximately ten percent of those 
surveyed had “personal experience of harmful speech on the internet”, with that 
number rising to 22 percent of 18-19 year olds.17  
 
This research shows that harmful digital communications currently affect a large 
number of New Zealanders, and this problem is the cause of growing concern for 
those who deal with complaints. The research also importantly highlights that harmful 
digital communications impact adults as well as children. Despite adolescent cyber-
bullying being the most well known example of online abuse, this harmful behaviour 
affects people of all ages, and at all stages of life.18 
2 Effects of harmful digital communications 
The Law Commission considered the unique nature of digital communications, and 
pointed to a number of factors that contribute to the distinctive type of harm online 
abuse can cause. In particular, it focused on the ability of online communicators to 
adopt anonymous or multiple personae, the extent to which digital communications 
can reach a victim at any place and time due to the universality of technology, the 
viral nature of the internet, and the permanence of digital information as key features 
distinguishing digital abuse from other types of harmful communications.19  
 
The Law Commission discussed a number of submissions it received from victims of 
harmful digital communications describing the difficulties they had experienced. Not 
only did many of these victims report feeling physically unsafe, they also described 
how online abuse had contributed to the breakdown of personal and professional 
relationships, and the loss of their reputations.20  
                                                        
15 Harmful Digital Communications, above n 9, at [2.15]. 
16 Harmful Digital Communications, above n 9, at [2.15]. 
17 Harmful Digital Communications, above n 9 at [2.18]. 
18 PMCSA Report, above n 10, at 217. 
19 Harmful Digital Communications at [2.42]. 
20 At [2.40]. 
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B Adolescents  
The large majority of research available on harmful digital communications focuses 
on the prevalence and effects of cyber-bullying amongst school aged children and 
adolescents. Bullying in general is a pervasive problem in New Zealand. In the first 
New Zealand study of its kind, a Victoria University researcher has found that 94 
percent of the school staff she surveyed had seen bullying of some kind in their 
school.21 Research carried out by Netsafe estimates that approximately 1 in 5 New 
Zealand high school students have experienced some form of cyber-bullying or 
harassment. 22  While research varies as to exactly how prevalent cyber-bullying 
actually is, data shows it is likely that at least 15 percent of New Zealand 
adolescents have been the victim of cyber-bullying at some point.23 
1  What is cyber-bullying? 
The term “bullying” has countless definitions, and may mean a variety of things to 
different people based on their experiences. For the purpose of this paper, it is 
sufficient to refer to the broad meaning given to it by Dan Olweus, who describes 
bullying as recurrent, intentionally harmful acts that involve a power imbalance 
between the aggressor(s) and the victim.24  
Cyber-bullying occurs when a child or adolescent targets another child or adolescent 
using the internet, digital technologies or mobile phones.25 It has been defined as 
“cruelty to others by sending or posting harmful material or engaging in other forms 
of social aggression using the internet or other digital technologies.”26 Cyber-bullying 
can take the form of many different activities, including posting private photos, 
                                                        
21 Vanessa A Green and others “Bullying in New Zealand Schools: A Final Report” (2013) Victoria 
University of Wellington at 5. 
22 Harmful Digital Communications, above n 9, at [2.28]. 
23 PMCSA Report, above n 10, at 125. 
24 Dan Olweus Bullying at school: What we know and what we can do (Oxford, UK, 1993).  
25 Colleen Barnett “Cyberbullying: A New Frontier and a New Standard; A Survey of and Proposed 
Changes to State Cyberbullying Statutes” (2009) 27 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 579 at 579. 
26 Benjamin Walther “Cyberbullying: Holding Grownups Liable For Negligent Entrustment” (2012) 49 
Hous L Rev 531 at 532.   
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sending harassing messages by phone or e-mail, or posting offensive comments on a 
blog or social media website.27 
Key aspects of traditional bullying and cyber-bullying overlap considerably.28 For 
example the offender’s motivation to inflict harm on his or her victims, remains the 
same in both cases.29 The main difference between traditional bullying and cyber-
bullying is the way the bully is able to continue the harmful acts beyond school 
premises, and essentially “follow targets into their homes.”30 Cyber-bullying is far 
more ubiquitous than other forms of bullying in the lives of those being targeted, and 
may result in stronger negative outcomes than traditional bullying.31 
 
A factor that further exacerbates the effects of cyber-bullying is the difficulty in 
supervising online behaviour.32 While teachers or school administrators are expected 
to intervene in traditional bullying, there is no clear figure that regulates bullying on 
the internet.33 It has been said that adolescents lose their inhibitions in the absence of 
central power and clear boundaries.34 Additionally, physical distance can allow young 
people to trivialise their behaviour and the harm it may be causing.35 
2  What harm does cyber-bullying cause? 
Research shows clear evidence of an association between suicide and bullying among 
children and adolescents. A Canadian report found that victims of bullying exhibit 
high levels of suicide ideation, and are more likely to have attempted suicide 
                                                        
27 Walther, above n 26, at 532. For a detailed discussion on various types of cyber-bullying see Darryn 
Cathryn Beckstrom “State Legislation Mandating School Cyberbullying Policies and the Potential 
Threat to Students’ Free Speech Rights” 33 (2008) VT L REV 283 at 290. 
28 Robert Tokunaga “Following you home from school: A critical review and synthesis of research on 
cyberbullying victimization” (2010) 26 Computers in Human Behavior 277 at 278. 
29 Tokunga, above n 28, at 278. 
30 Tokunga, above n 28, at 278. 
31 Tokunga, above n 28, at 281. 
32 Dianne L Hoff and Shaheen Shariff “Cyber bullying:  Clarifying Legal Boundaries for School 
Supervision in Cyberspace” (2007) 1 International Journal of Cyber Criminology 76 at 76. 
33 Tokunga, above n 28, at 279. 
34 Hoff and Shariff, above n 32, at 76. 
35 Hoff and Shariff, above n 32, at 76. 
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compared with non-victims.36 Statements made by New Zealand’s Chief Coroner, 
Judge Neil MacLean, reinforce the findings of this report. Judge MacLean has 
publically supported proposed law changes targeting cyber-bullying, saying that this 
type of bullying is "often a background factor" in suicides coming before coroners:37  
We know it's certainly a risk factor for suicide, and we know that adolescents 
often talk about interpersonal problems when investigators are looking into not 
necessarily completed suicides but self-harm. 
As well as an association with suicidal thoughts and actions, victims of cyber-
bullying are reported to have lower self-esteem, higher levels of depression, and to 
experience significant life challenges.38 A report focusing on the effects of cyber-
bullying found the disturbances caused by cyber-bullying range from trivial levels 
of distress and frustration to serious psychosocial and life problems.39  
 
In the Human Rights Commission’s submission to the select committee on the Bill, it 
was pointed out that the right to be free from bullying is fundamental to children’s 
right to personal security.40 In a media release regarding the bill, Chief Commissioner 
David Rutherford commented:41 
 
There is no difference between the harm caused by bullying in the real or 
digital worlds. It’s not OK to threaten anyone. Bullying – including 
cyberbullying – is a major human rights issue in New Zealand because it 
threatens the very right to life. 
 
The Law Commission concluded that the problem of harmful digital 
communications is sufficiently serious and widespread to justify amendment to 
New Zealand law. 
                                                        
36A Brunstein Klomek, A Sourander and M Gould “The association of suicide and bullying in 
childhood to young adulthood: a review of cross-sectional and longitudinal research findings” (2010) 
55 Can J Psychiatry 282 at 283. 
37 Simon Collins and Vaimoana Tapaleao “Suicide link in cyber-bullying” <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
38 Tokunga, above n 28, at 281. 
39 Tokunga, above n 28, at 281. 
40 Human Rights Commission “Submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the Harmful 
Digital Communications Act 2013”.  
41 Human Rights Commission “Harmful Digital Communications Bill” (media release, 20 March 2014) 
<www.hrc.co.nz>. 
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III  The Harmful Digital Communications Bill  
The Harmful Digital Communications Bill was introduced in November 2013, and 
is largely based on the Law Commission’s ministerial briefing paper.42 That paper 
assesses whether the availability of new forms of communication require alterations 
to New Zealand law.43 The Law Commission concluded that some areas of the 
current law relating to communications have been rendered unsatisfactory by 
technological and social changes. It found that laws predating the internet are in 
some cases unable to sufficiently accommodate new forms of communications.44 
Another issue discussed in the ministerial briefing paper is the lack of accessibility 
to the relevant law, because of its spread across case law and statute. The Law 
Commission was concerned with the difficulty this created in allowing people to 
appreciate the legal implications of their online activities, or to access legal 
remedies.45  
The ministerial briefing paper discusses the existing applicable law as it currently 
stands in relation to threats and intimidation, harassment, sexual matters, incitement, 
defamation, breach of confidence and privacy. It then sets out how this law applies, or 
would be likely to apply, in situations involving harmful digital communications. The 
paper then makes suggestions as to how some areas of law could be changed to better 
reflect the technological and social changes that have taken place over the last few 
years. Some of these reforms aim simply to amend laws to make them more easily 
applicable in the digital environment.46 However the Law Commission also proposed 
the establishment of new offences to address the specific harms caused by certain 
types of digital communication. 47  The Bill implements the majority of 
recommendations made by the ministerial briefing paper, including the establishment 
of a civil enforcement regime, new criminal offences, and amendments to current 
                                                        
42 Harmful Digital Communications Bill, above n 11, (explanatory note). 
43 Harmful Digital Communications, above n 9, at [4.3]. 
44 Harmful Digital Communications, above n 9, at [4.53]. 
45 At [4.54]. 
46 At [4.55]. 
47 At [4.56]. 
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laws. This section gives a brief overview of the Bill, and how it affects law currently 
in place. 
 
A  Civil Enforcement Regime 
 
The civil enforcement regime established by the Bill aims to provide effective and 
accessible remedies to victims of harmful digital communications, responses that are 
proportionate to harm and remedies that are cost effective and quick.48 It is intended 
that this regime will deal with the vast majority of harmful digital communication 
complaints.49 Clause 8 of the Bill provides for initial complaints about harmful digital 
communications to be made to an “approved agency”, which may investigate a 
complaint and attempt to resolve it by negotiation, mediation, and persuasion.50 The 
approved agency will operate as the first stop for complainants. If a complainant is 
unsatisfied with the action taken by the approved agency, he or she may then apply 
for an order from the District Court.51  
 
The ministerial briefing paper advises that the already established NGO NetSafe be 
given formal recognition as the approved agency, responsible for advising 
complainants and, where appropriate, attempting to achieve a resolution by 
negotiation, mediation and persuasion. 52  Whether or not Netsafe will in fact be 
deemed the approved agency under section 7 is not yet known. 
 
The Bill sets out 10 “communication principles” to guide the court and approved 
agency. It states that a digital communication should not:53 
1. disclose sensitive personal facts about an individual; 
2. be threatening, intimidating, or menacing; 
3. be grossly offensive to a reasonable person in the complainant's position; 
4. be indecent or obscene; 
5. be part of a pattern of conduct that constitutes harassment; 
                                                        
48 Harmful Digital Communications Bill, above n 11, (Justice and Electoral Committee Commentary). 
49 Ministry of Justice Harmful Digital Communications Bill – Initial Briefing (6 March 2014) at [11]. 
50 Harmful Digital Communications Bill, above n 11, (explanatory note). 
51 Harmful Digital Communications Bill, above n 11, cl 17. 
52 Harmful Digital Communications, above n 9, at [66]. 
53 Harmful Digital Communications Bill, above n 11, at cl 6.  
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6. make a false allegation; 
7. contain a matter that is published in breach of confidence; 
8. incite or encourage anyone to send a message to a person with the intention of 
causing harm to that person; 
9. incite or encourage another person to commit suicide; 
10. denigrate a person by reason of his or her colour, race, ethnic or national 
origins, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disability. 
 
Under clause 11(2), a District Court cannot grant an application for an order unless:  
(a) it is satisfied that there has been a serious or repeated breach of one or more 
communication principles, and;  
(b) the breach has caused or is likely to cause harm to a person.  
 
The Bill defines harm as “serious emotional distress”.54 This is intended to be a 
relatively high threshold, and would not include mere embarrassment, anxiety, 
worry or outrage; however it is not intended to be so high a threshold as to require a 
psychiatric or medical assessment.55 This is a purely subjective standard, as the 
civil enforcement regime aims to remedy actual harm and is not intended to be 
punitive in nature.56 Where both requirements are satisfied, a court is able to issue a 
number of orders against the communicator, including an order to take down 
material and an order that the defendant cease the conduct concerned.57  
 
In some cases, the orders available to the court under the civil enforcement regime 
apply to both the original communicator of the harmful material, as well as website 
hosts, ISPs and internet intermediaries. While both categories of orders raise very 
interesting issues, the discussion in this paper is confined to matters surrounding 
orders made against the original communicator, and the implications those orders may 
have on the right to freedom of expression. 
 
B  New Offences 
                                                        
54 Harmful Digital Communications Bill, above n 11, cl 4. 
55 Ministry of Justice, above n 49, at [10]. 
56 Harmful Digital Communications, above n 9, at [5.62]. 
57 Harmful Digital Communications Bill, above n 11, cl 17. 
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Failure to comply with an order made by the District Court under the civil 
enforcement regime will be made an offence under clause 18. In the case of a 
natural person, the offence is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
6 months or a fine not exceeding $5,000. In the case of a body corporate, it is 
punishable by a fine not exceeding $20,000.58 
 
Clause 19 of the Bill creates an offence of causing harm by posting a digital 
communication. This offence was drafted in response to the Law Commission’s 
finding that the criminal law does not adequately address communications that inflict 
distress or mental harm where it does not relate to fear of physical damage.  59 The 
offence is intended to apply in three situations that are currently not criminalised: 
1. Where a person is threatened or intimidated and suffers emotional harm, but 
does not necessarily fear a risk to their physical wellbeing; 
2. Where an intimate visual recording, which was made with the consent of the 
subject, is published without the consent of that person. This is commonly 
known as “revenge porn”, and does not currently fall under the offences 
relating to intimate visual recordings under the Crimes Act 1961 as those 
offences only relate to recordings made without consent; 
3. Malicious impersonation. Impersonation is currently only criminalised where 
there is a gain or a loss to another person.60 
 
The offence set out in clause 19 is as follows:61 
 (1) A person commits an offence if— 
(a) the person posts a digital communication with the intention that 
it cause harm to a victim; and 
(b) posting the communication would cause harm to an ordinary 
reasonable person in the position of the victim; and 
(c) posting the communication causes harm to the victim. 
                                                        
58 Harmful Digital Communications Bill, above n 11, cl 18. 
59 Harmful Digital Communications, above n 9, at [4.66]. 
60 Ministry of Justice, above n 49 at [22.1]. 
61 Clause 19. 
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(2) In determining whether a post would cause harm, the court may take 
into account any factors it considers relevant, including— 
(a) the extremity of the language used: 
(b) the age and characteristics of the victim: 
(c) whether the digital communication was anonymous: 
(d) whether the digital communication was repeated: 
(e) the extent of circulation of the digital communication: 
(f) whether the digital communication is true or false: 
(g) the context in which the digital communication appeared. 
(3) A person who commits an offence against this section is liable on 
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years. 
(4) In this section, victim means the individual who is the target of a posted 
digital communication. 
 
This offence will be applicable to persons aged 14 and older.62 
 
C  Amendments to Existing Acts 
 
The Bill also proposes amendments to existing provisions in order to make them more 
readily applicable to digital communications. One of these amendments is to section 
179 of the Crimes Act 1961, which makes it an offence to incite, counsel or procure a 
person to commit suicide, if that person actually commits or attempts to commit 
suicide.63 The Bill amends this section by adding an offence of aiding and abetting 
suicide where suicide or attempting to commit suicide does not result.64 
 
The Bill also aims to amend the Harassment Act 1997 by expanding the meaning of 
“harassment” to include a single continuing act that is carried out over a protracted 
period.65 This is to incorporate offensive material that may be posted and left on a 
social media site for several weeks or months.66 The Harassment Act is also amended 
                                                        
62 Ministry of Justice, above n 49 at 41. 
63 Crimes Act 1961, s 179. 
64 Clause 24. 
65 Clause 26. 
66 Harmful Digital Communications Bill, above n 11, (explanatory note). 
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to include electronic communications in the definition of specified act, 67  and by 
including as a standard condition of a restraining order a condition that, in the case of 
a continuing act (as defined in section 3) the respondent must take reasonable steps to 
prevent the specified act from continuing.68  
 
Section 30 of the Bill proposes to amend section 61 of the Human Rights Act 1993 by 
including references to the use of electronic communications, so the section will 
prohibit broadcasts by means of any electronic communication if the broadcast causes 
racial disharmony.69 The Bill also extends section 62 and section 63 of the Human 
Rights Act by expanding the situations to which the racial harassment and sexual 
harassment provisions apply. Under the Bill, the section will apply if a person 
participates in a forum for the exchange of ideas and information.70 
 
The current principles 10 and 11 in section 6 of the Privacy Act 1993 limit the way 
information, collected by an agency for one purpose, is used or distributed for an 
alternative purpose. An exception to both of these principles is when the agency 
believes on reasonable grounds that“the source of the information is a publicly 
available publication” to which the Harmful Digital Communications Bill adds “and 
that, in the circumstances of the case, it would not be unfair or unreasonable to use the 
information”.71 
 
Beyond this brief description of the proposed amendments, this paper will not 
consider the aspects of the Bill that amend existing laws. While the Bill contains 
multiple aspects worthy of examination, the focus of the remainder of this paper is on 
the establishment of the civil enforcement regime and the offence of causing harm by 
posting a digital communication.  
 
IV  Freedom of Expression Rationales 
Freedom of expression is an important right, and is protected in almost all liberal, 
                                                        
67 Clause 27. 
68 Clause 28. 
69 Clause 30. 
70 Clauses 31 and 32. 
71 Clause 34. 
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democratic societies.72 The right to freedom of expression under the NZBORA gives 
everyone “the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any 
kind in any form.”73 In the case of Moonen v Film and Literature Board, the right was 
interpreted by the Court of Appeal as being “as wide as the human imagination.”74 It 
may include “anything attempting to convey some view or purpose”.75  
Freedom of expression is a complex right, and one that has given rise to a large and 
highly developed body of jurisprudence.76 This section of the paper will discuss three 
of the most dominant theoretical justifications for the protection of free expression. It 
will demonstrate that the speech prohibited under the civil enforcement regime and 
the offence of causing harm by posting a digital communication are not completely 
compatible with traditional justifications for freedom of expression. Because of this, 
the limitation on the right imposed by the Bill can be justified on a theoretical basis.  
The three major rationales underlying free speech are:77 
a) The importance of the discovery of truth;  
b) Self-fulfilment; and 
c) Participation in democracy. 
A  The Importance of the Discovery of Truth 
The importance of the discovery of truth is at the core of John Stewart Mill’s 
justification for free speech.78 It is best recognised in the famous words of Justice 
Holmes: “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
                                                        
72 Alexander Tsesis “Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy” 2009 44 
Wake For L Rev 497 at 521.  
73 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
74 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) at [19] per Tipping J. 
75 Thompson v Police [2013] 1 NZLR 848 at [76]. 
76 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: a commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2012) at [13.1.2]. 
77 Claudia Geiringer and Steven Price “Moving From Self-Justification to Demonstrable Justification – 
the Bill of Rights and the Broadcasting Standards Authority” in Jeremy Finn and Steven Todd (eds) 
Law, Liberty, Legislation: Essays in Honour of John Butler QC (LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2008) at 
320. See also Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [233] per Tipping J; Brooker v Police [2007] 3 
NZLR 91 at [114] per McGrath J. 
78 John Stuart Mill On Liberty (Cambridge University Press, 1959) as cited in Kent Greenawalt “Free 
Speech Justifications” (1989) 89 Colum L Rev 119 at 130. 
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competition of the market.”79 This rationale has also become known by the metaphor 
of a “marketplace of ideas”, based on its conception that the validity of new ideas is 
tested through competition in the market.80 It is premised on the notion that truth is a 
fundamental good, and the exposure of truth is important in the development of 
society. 81  According to Mill, even information that is wholly untrue should be 
protected under this rationale, because its expression causes the reexamination and 
reinforcement of truth.82 This argument is based not on the idea that individuals will 
always be able to immediately identify what is true and what is false, but rather on the 
assumption that if a wide variety of views can be expressed in the marketplace, in the 
long run the truth will become evident.83 By restricting digital expression that causes 
harm, the Bill prima facie conflicts with this theory; preventing that speech from 
being added to the marketplace of ideas.  
The rationale has, however, been subject to criticism by commentators who argue it is 
overly simplistic.84 One problem identified with the “search for truth” theory is the 
reality of inequality amongst communicators in the marketplace of ideas.85 Victims of 
online abuse often report feeling powerless due to the overwhelming reach of the 
internet and the fact that others are easily encouraged to partake in similar bullying 
behaviour. 86  This may prevent victims from feeling able to communicate their 
perspective in order to contribute to the marketplace.  
The search for truth is only effective if competing ideas are given equal attention and 
consideration, which is said to infrequently be the case in reality.87 Sadurski writes 
that a “market failure” can occur when participants in the marketplace lack the 
resources and incentives to investigate the truthfulness of statements made.88 They 
may instead rely on messages that are already socially dominant, and have no 
                                                        
79 Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes J Dissenting) as cited in Wojciech 
Sadurski Freedom of Speech and Its Limits (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Massachusetts, 1999) at 8. 
80 Juliet Moses “Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression” (1996) 8 Auckland U L 
Rev 185 at 191. 
81 Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985) at 8.  
82 Greenawalt, above n 78 at 130. 
83 Greenawalt, above n 78, at 131. 
84 Sadurski, above n 79, at 9. 
85 Greenawalt, above n 78, at 134. 
86 Harmful Digital Communications, above n 9, at [2.42]. 
87 Greenawalt, above n 78, at 134. 
88 Sadurski, above n 79, at 9-10. 
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motivation to look further. 89  Where victims of online abuse are not able to 
communicate effectively in the marketplace, the harmful messages of “bullies” may 
become overpowering, particularly where they are offered frequently and by multiple 
people. In this situation, those receiving the information may feel compelled to rely 
on the harmful statements because they can find no information to the contrary to 
cause them to examine what they have repeatedly heard. When this happens, the 
truthfulness of the statements might never be questioned, and a market failure of the 
type described by Sadurski would occur. 
B  Self-Fulfilment 
The self-fulfilment rationale theorises that the ability to form opinions and beliefs 
through public discussion allows personal growth through intellectual and spiritual 
development.90 This principle is based on the idea that speech is a vital way in which 
individuals express who they really are, and feedback from that expression helps 
those individuals in their process of self-perception. 91  The restriction of ideas or 
opinions a person wishes to explore can be perceived as an affront to that person’s 
sense of dignity.92 According to this rationale, the right to freedom of expression 
exists even where it is contrary to the welfare and development of society.93 Under 
this rationale, the Bill unjustifiably limits the self-expression and therefore the self-
fulfilment of the perpetrators of harmful digital communications.  
The self-fulfilment rationale has, however, also been subject to various criticisms. A 
particularly relevant objection is that it only applies to speech, and not to other 
conduct capable of expressing a person’s identity, desires, and preferences. Sadurski 
suggests that in terms of self-fulfilment, speech cannot be distinguished from other 
types of expression in any meaningful way. 94  While other harmful acts, such as 
physical violence or reckless driving, may also be a successful mode of self-
expression, the law places limits on these activities because of the harm they cause to 
                                                        
89 Greenwalt, above n 78, at 134. 
90 Barendt, above n 81, at 14. 
91 Sadurski, above n 79, at 17. 
92 Greenawalt, above n 78 at 145. 
93 Barendt, above n 81, at 14. 
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others.95 Based on this argument, while the law recognises that speech is an important 
mode of expression worth protecting, some limits on the right to freedom of 
expression are justified in order to prevent harm to others. Sadurski argues that if the 
reason to protect free speech is to enable the self-expression of the speaker, then 
harmful speech must be subject to the same limits as we accept for other modes of 
expression, “communicative or otherwise.” 96  This rationale is therefore not a 
persuasive argument against the regulation of abusive speech under the Bill, because 
the harm caused by harmful digital communications justifies reasonable limits on 
freedom of expression. 
C  Participation in Democracy 
Liberal democracies are dependent on the choices made by citizens.97 Free speech 
contributes to democracy by ensuring those citizens are assisted in grasping 
significant political truths, which gives meaning to the exercise of democratic rights.98 
This is said to be the main principle underlying the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, which is based on the idea that “freedom to think as you will and 
to speak as you think are means indispensible to the discovery and spread of political 
truth.” 99  Alexander Meiklejohn argued that citizens have the right to understand 
political issues in order to participate meaningfully in the functioning of 
democracy. 100  Under this rationale, it is inappropriate for government officials to 
decide which political messages may or may not be heard due to their interest in 
retaining the favour of the public in order to remain in office. 101 The democratic 
rationale for freedom of expression has been relied on in major New Zealand court 
decisions; such as Lange v Atkinson, where the Privy Council held defamation laws 
should be limited to prevent the chilling of speech about elected officials.102 
This rationale is a particularly popular one used to validate the protection of free 
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speech in modern Western democracies.103 It has, however, been criticised for its 
inability to justify the protection of non-political speech. The crux of the critique is, 
even if it can be accepted that freedom of speech relating to political issues is 
necessary in a democracy, it does not follow that democracy also justifies speech on 
non-political issues being afforded the same protection. 104  Based on this 
interpretation, the type of speech the Bill is aimed at prohibiting will most often not 
be covered by this rationale. The Law Commission recognised the importance of free 
political speech in its ministerial briefing paper, and indicated that the 
recommendations it made were not aimed at censorship of this kind of speech, but 
rather gratuitous personal attacks of a serious nature.105 However, as this paper will 
discuss in greater detail in part V, the Bill may in fact be sufficiently broad to be 
capable of including political speech where such speech causes the requisite harm. 
This critique distinguishing between political and non-political speech has been 
objected to for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is argued that categorising speech in 
such a way is not a straightforward task. Differentiating between speech that is of a 
political nature and speech that is not political will not always be possible. Therefore, 
any restriction on “non-political” speech might have a chilling effect on all speech 
due to the uncertainty of what may fall within that restriction.106 Another objection, 
advanced by Meiklejohn, recognises that our ultimate democratic choices are 
influenced by more than simply political expression.107 Meiklejohn argued that free 
discussion of all topics is important in a democracy, not just discussion of “political” 
issues.108 Based on Meiklejohn’s version of the democratic rationale, the restrictions 
placed on harmful speech in the Bill amount to a limitation of freedom of expression 
that cannot be justified, because even harmful speech contributes to the democratic 
choices of the individuals who hear it.  
However, the more persuasive argument is that this theory provides a rationale for 
protection only to political speech, and that regulation of other types of speech should 
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be permitted so long as political discussion regarding the necessity of such regulation 
is not prevented.109  
D  Rationales Conclusion 
The above analysis of each of these three rationales highlights their inability to 
adequately support protection of the type of the speech that aims to be prohibited by 
the Bill. Therefore the restriction on harmful digital communications can be justified 
on theoretical grounds. However, the law does protect a general right to freedom of 
expression in the NZBORA subject to reasonable limitations, and it is thus necessary 
to also consider whether the restriction can be demonstrably justified on legal 
grounds. 
V  Freedom of Expression Under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 
The NZBORA requires that limitations placed on rights must be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.110 This section of the paper considers the 
extent of the limitation placed on the right to freedom of expression by the civil 
enforcement regime and the criminal offence of causing harm by posting a digital 
communication. It analyses whether any limitation is able to be demonstrably justified 
under section 5, applying the test established in case law. 
A  Section 5 Analysis: Relevant Law 
The right to freedom of expression contained in the NZBORA has been interpreted as 
widely as possible, as held in Moonen.111 The right to freedom of expression can, 
however, be limited where it is considered necessary to do so. Section 5 of the 
NZBORA affirms the proposition that rights are not absolute, but can be subject to 
reasonable limits. 112  An enactment is still considered to be consistent with the 
NZBORA if it limits a right or freedom contained in it, so long as the limitation can 
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be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."113  
 
The test used to determine whether limitations on rights are demonstrably justified is 
a proportionality test. The New Zealand approach to proportionality was set out in the 
case of Hansen v R, and originates from the Supreme Court of Canada case of R v 
Oakes.114 The two-stage test as adapted by Tipping J in Hansen asks: 
(1) Does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify 
curtailment of the right or freedom? 
(2) Secondly, 
(a) Is the limiting measure rationally connected with its purpose? 
(b) Does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than is 
reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose? 
(c) Is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective? 
 
In essence, this inquiry is concerned with whether the method used to achieve 
Parliament’s objective is proportionate to its purpose. As Tipping J noted in Moonen, 
“a sledgehammer should not be used to crack a nut.”115  
 
Before applying this test to each of the relevant provisions, Parliament’s intended 
meaning must first be ascertained. It must then be determined whether that intended 
meaning is in fact apparently inconsistent with a relevant right or freedom.116 Tipping 
J held this initial exercise should proceed according to the principle “a meaning 
inconsistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed by the Bill of Rights should not 
lightly be attributed to Parliament.” 117  However, he stated where an inconsistent 
meaning is found, the appropriate next step for the court is to consider whether this 
inconsistency can be demonstrably justified under section 5.118 
 
B  Does Parliament’s Intended Meaning Appear to Limit a Guaranteed Right?  
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1  Civil enforcement regime 
Parliament’s intention can be ascertained by reference to the powers given to the 
District Court under clause 17 of the Bill. This clause says that where there has been a 
serious, repeated, or threatened breach of one or more of the communication 
principles, and the breach has caused or is likely to cause harm to an individual, the 
District Court may issue a number of orders against a defendant. These are as 
follows:119 
(a) an order to take down or disable material: 
(b) an order that the defendant cease the conduct concerned: 
(c) an order that the defendant not encourage any other persons to engage in 
similar communications towards the affected individual: 
(d) an order that a correction be published: 
(e) an order that a right of reply be given to the affected individual: 
(f) an order that an apology be published. 
Parliament is intending to limit and does limit a communicator’s right to impart 
harmful information. It does this by granting the Court the right to issue orders 
requiring that material is taken down or that conduct is ceased. When the right to 
freedom of expression is limited in this way, it is also necessarily limited in terms 
of the right to seek and receive information. This is because when a person is 
constrained from imparting information, listeners are prevented from receiving that 
information.  
Freedom of expression is also limited by the Court’s ability to order that a 
correction, right of reply or apology is published. Inherent in the right to freedom 
of expression is the right not to speak,120 and this right is denied when a court 
compels speech. Therefore, the power given to the District Court to grant these 
orders is also an apparent limitation to the right to freedom of expression. 
2  Criminal offence 
Parliament’s intention in relation to the criminal offence is clear; the purpose of 
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clause 19 is to criminalise the posting of a digital communication with the intention to 
cause harm, where it does in fact cause harm, and where it would have caused harm to 
the ordinary reasonable person in the position of the victim.  
Clause 19 prevents the impartation and receiving of information by criminalising 
certain types of communication. Clause 19 is therefore also a limitation on the right to 
freedom of expression.  
 
C  Is the Inconsistency a Justified Limitation? 
Section 5 stipulates that any limitation on a right or freedom affirmed by the 
NZBORA must satisfy three criteria. It must be prescribed by law, it must be 
reasonable, and it must be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.121 
1  Are the provisions prescribed by law? 
“To be prescribed by law, limits must be identifiable and expressed with sufficient 
precision in an Act of Parliament…be neither ad hoc nor arbitrary and their nature 
and consequences must be clear, although the consequences need not be foreseeable 
with absolute certainty.” 122 
This Bill has not yet been passed into law, and is therefore not currently an Act of 
Parliament. This paper anticipates however that the Bill will successfully pass through 
the House and become law. The paper therefore analyses the Bill’s NZBORA 
compatibility in that context.  
In a decision subsequent to Hansen, Elias CJ stated that, in order to be characterised 
as a law, “a rule must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual 
to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the 
public.” 123  Both the civil enforcement regime and the clause 19 offence are 
sufficiently precise in their wording to meet these requirements. Potential 
communicators can look to the law to determine what type of communication is not 
permitted under these provisions. This is especially true of the civil enforcement 
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regime, which is particularly comprehensive in its description of unacceptable types 
of communications through its inclusion of communication principles. The criminal 
offence is less comprehensive in its drafting, containing only harm requirements and 
no further information as to the context in which communications might be made. 
This omission will be discussed further under the proportionality analysis, however, 
for the purposes of this initial stage of the inquiry the offence is also adequately clear 
to meet the standard of “prescribed by law.” 
The court in Hansen considered the reasonableness and justifiability criteria together 
using the test set out above from the Canadian case of Oakes.124 This approach asks 
whether the limiting measure serves a purpose sufficiently important to justify 
curtailment of the right or freedom. Once this is established, the test then asks 
whether the means selected to address the concerns are proportionate to the harm 
being addressed.125 
2   Do the provisions serve a sufficiently important purpose? 
McGrath J noted that it would be rare for a court to find that an objective of the 
legislature was a goal without legitimacy. 126  Deference should be given to 
Parliament at this stage of the inquiry, which will almost always result in a finding 
that the concern being addressed is an adequately important one. This stage of the 
inquiry will usually be rather straightforward, with more in depth consideration 
occurring in the second part of the Oakes test. 
Digital communications have introduced novel forms of harm due to the public 
nature, reach and longevity of the communications.127 The Law Commission paper 
found that as many as one in ten New Zealanders has personal experience of 
harmful digital communications.128 It also concluded that current legal remedies for 
such harm are insufficient.129 The provisions in question are intended to prevent 
harm caused to victims of online abuse, or cyber-bullying. These harms, discussed 
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in part II, include the presence of higher levels of suicide ideation and depression 
than in non-victims, and other significant issues. Based on research illustrating the 
close association between cyber-bulling and these types of harms, and taking into 
account the requirement that deference be given to Parliament at this point, it can be 
concluded that harmful digital communications are a pressing and substantial 
concern. Therefore, interference with the right to freedom of expression is warranted 
in order to reduce or prevent their occurrence. 
3 Is there a rational connection? 
The first section of the proportionality analysis asks whether the proposed limit on the 
relevant right is rationally connected with the objective of the provision.130 As in the 
case of the previous inquiry, the majority in Hansen said that in carrying out this part 
of the analysis, substantial deference should be given to Parliament.131 Therefore, 
Tipping J stated that the test for whether a provision is rationally connected to its 
objective should carry a reasonably low threshold test.132  
(a)   Civil enforcement regime 
The civil enforcement regime is designed to mitigate harm caused to individuals by 
digital communications by providing victims with a quick and efficient means of 
redress.133 The Bill achieves this by granting the District Court the power to make a 
number of orders, including orders that harmful material be removed from the 
internet, and orders aimed at alleviating harm caused by the posting of such 
material, such as requiring a right of reply or an apology.134 Where an order made 
by the District Court under the civil enforcement regime is not fulfilled, a criminal 
sanction may be applied under the clause 18 offence of non-compliance with an 
order.135 It is logical to suggest that removal of harmful digital communications 
from the internet, and in some cases a public apology or opportunity to offer a reply 
to harmful material, will go some way to mitigate the harms caused to the victims 
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of online abuse. Therefore, there is a rational connection between the objective and 
the proposed limit on the right to freedom of expression. 
 
(b)   Criminal Offence 
The question to be answered in terms of clause 19 is whether the criminalisation of 
particularly harmful online abuse is connected to Parliament’s objective. By 
criminalising harmful digital communications, the Bill aims to deter and prevent such 
conduct.136 Criminalisation has a preventative effect by giving fair warning of the fact 
of conduct’s illegality and the punishment arising from that conduct to those 
considering engaging in it. 137  The offence of causing harm by posting a digital 
communication will inevitably cause some deterrent effect to those who take notice of 
its existence. It follows then that there is a logical connection between the means and 
the objective of this provision. Whether or not this particular offence is the 
appropriate way to achieve this purpose is assessed in the following two inquiries.  
4 Is the impairment greater than reasonably necessary? 
The proper application of this portion of the Oakes test has been the subject of much 
debate. The interpretation of this limb requiring any limit to be the least possible 
intrusion on the right has been widely criticised as being too strict.138 In Hansen, both 
Tipping and Blanchard JJ expressed the opinion that the test should instead ask 
whether the limit imposed on the relevant right “is no greater than is reasonably 
necessary to achieve Parliament’s objective.”139 Tipping J said that in practical terms, 
this requires the court to consider whether another method could have been used to 
achieve Parliament’s objective at a lower cost to the right being limited.140 In carrying 
out this assessment, Tipping J emphasized it should be recognised that Parliament has 
some “margin of appreciation” in its choices as to the means chosen to limit a right.141  
(a)   Civil Enforcement Regime 
                                                        
136 Harmful Digital Communications Bill, above n 11, cl 3(a). 
137 Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner “Prevention and Criminalization: Justification and Limits” 
(2012) 15 New Crim L Rev 542 at 548. 
138 Hanna Wilberg, “The Bill of Rights and Other Enactments” [2007] NZLJ 112 at 117. 
139 Hansen v R, above n 13, at [126] and [79]. 
140 Hansen v R, above n 13, at [126]. 
141 Hansen v R, above n 13, at [113]-[119]. 
  30 
(i)   Approved agency 
 
Under the civil enforcement regime, an applicant may apply for an order from the 
District Court only once the approved agency has first considered a complaint about 
the communication, and had a reasonable opportunity to consider and decide what 
action (if any) to take.142 The approved agency’s powers are reasonably limited; it 
may only use advice, negotiation, mediation and persuasion to resolve complaints. 
This initial stage of the process does not limit freedom of expression excessively, as it 
gives the speaker the opportunity to decide for him or herself whether or not to 
remove the communication in question once the harmful consequences of the 
communication have been made clear to him or her. The right to refuse to remove the 
communication or cease the conduct in question is in theory still intact at this stage.  
 
(ii)   Clause 17 orders  
 
Where recourse under the approved agency fails, a complainant may apply for an 
order to be made by the District Court. The District Court is granted much broader 
powers than the approved agency under the civil enforcement regime, and therefore 
the power given to the Court to make one or more of the orders set out in clause 17 is 
a far more significant encroachment on freedom of expression. However, in order to 
achieve Parliament’s objective, it is likely that the availability of some or all of these 
orders is necessary. This is particularly so in relation to the right of a judge to grant an 
order requiring a defendant to take down or disable material, or cease the conduct 
concerned, which would allow the Court to prevent harmful material from being 
communicated.143 While these orders may be seen as a substantial intrusion into the 
communicator’s right to freedom of expression, it is difficult to find alternative 
methods that could be used to ensure a lesser encroachment on the right while still 
achieving Parliament’s objective. In order for actual harm to be ameliorated, or for a 
potential harm to be averted, an order to take down or abstain from uploading harmful 
content is an essential power for the Court to have.  
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An example that highlights the necessity of such an order is when an intimate visual 
recording is posted without the consent of an applicant who appears in the recording. 
The most pressing concern for the applicant is that the recording is removed from the 
internet as quickly as possible so it is not available to be viewed online. No alternative 
outcome will adequately address the harm to the applicant in this situation. The same 
reasoning would apply in cases where personal facts have been revealed about a 
person on social media, or where particularly hurtful comments have been published 
where others can read them. The viral nature of the internet and the permanence of 
digital information can increase the impacts of bullying by creating potentially large 
audiences and allowing information to be used to re-victimise the target each time it is 
accessed.144 Without the ability to order that this material be taken down, or that it not 
be put online in the first place, the civil enforcement regime cannot achieve its 
purpose to any great level of success.  
 
Where an order that material be taken down is not justified, the court may make a 
number of other orders, including that a correction or apology be published, or that 
a right of reply be given to the affected individual. While these orders do still 
encroach on freedom of expression by compelling speech, they arguably represent 
a lesser intrusion on the communicator’s rights, and they allow the court to use take 
down orders only in the most severe and urgent cases. 
 
(iii)   Considerations for the Court 
 
The Bill requires there must be harm to a complainant, alongside a serious, repeated 
or threatened breach of one of the 10 communication principles before an order may 
be granted. Under the civil enforcement regime, the harm requirement is a purely 
subjective one.145 This is in contrast to the criminal offence, which is based on both 
subjective harm to the victim and objective harm, in the sense that the ordinary 
reasonable person in the position of the victim would suffer harm. By requiring that 
both subjective and objective harm be established before an order may be made under 
clause 17, the civil enforcement regime would apply to fewer cases and therefore 
limit freedom of expression to a lesser extent. To amend the civil enforcement regime 
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in this way may be in conflict with its purpose, however, which is not to punish 
wrongdoers or reflect community standards, but rather to protect those who actually 
suffer harm.146  
  
The Bill sets out a number of considerations the court must take into account before 
deciding whether an order should be made, and which order is the most 
appropriate. These are:147 
(a) the content of the communication and the level of harm caused by it; 
(b) the purpose of the communicator, in particular whether the 
communication was intended to cause harm; 
(c) the occasion, context, and subject matter of the communication; 
(d) the extent to which the communication has spread beyond the original 
parties to the communication; 
(e) the age and vulnerability of the affected individual; 
(f) the truth or falsity of the statement; 
(g) whether the communication is in the public interest; 
(h) the conduct of the defendant, including any attempt by the defendant to 
minimise the harm caused; 
(i) the conduct of the affected individual or complainant; 
(j) the technical and operational practicalities, and the costs, of an order; 
and 
(k) the appropriate individual or other person who should be subject to the 
order 
The Law Commission intended that these would allow the court to have regard to 
the importance of freedom of expression.148 These considerations are important in 
minimising how greatly the civil enforcement regime limits freedom of expression, 
as they help to ensure that orders will only be granted where necessary. The 
considerations also enable the Court to ensure that communications with significant 
value to society are able to be protected, particularly sub-clauses (c) and (g). 
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Once all of the clause 17 requirements are established, a court must then determine 
if a proposed order can be justified in a free and democratic society. 149  This 
requirement means that the communicator’s right to freedom of expression will be 
considered in each case, and an order should not be granted unless the limitation on 
that right can be justified. 
In his discussion on deference to parliament, Tipping J described a “target” which 
parliament’s appraisal must not miss in order for a limitation to be acceptable.150 
While the civil enforcement regime does undeniably limit the right to freedom of 
expression, the measure chosen by Parliament to enact this limitation “hits” the 
target. Therefore it is apparent that the limitation it imposes on the right to freedom 
of expression is not more than is reasonably necessary. There are no realistic 
alternatives to the regime that could still successfully achieve Parliament’s 
objective. 
(b)   Criminal Offence 
  (i)   Is there a need for a new criminal offence? 
The first consideration under this part of the analysis is whether establishing a 
criminal offence at all is necessary to achieve the objective set out by parliament. The 
objective of the provision, reducing harm caused by cyber-bullying and online abuse, 
could arguably be effectively achieved through the amendment of other criminal 
offences that pre-date the internet, such as harassment, threatening or blackmail. By 
extending these provisions to ensure that pre-existing offences apply in a digital 
context, it would also deal with the unusual double standard created by the offence, 
which is that only digital communications that cause harm are criminalised.151 This 
means that if a person wrote down on paper an objectively and subjectively harmful 
statement and physically posted it in a public forum, this act would not be 
criminalised. However, if the same statement were instead posted online, criminal 
sanctions would apply. The Law Commission considered whether extension of 
current laws would be sufficient in achieving the objective, but found that the 
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increased and unusual risk caused by digital communications warranted the creation 
of a new offence. The report states:152 
The new communication technologies can have effects which are more intrusive 
and more pervasive, and thus more hurtful, than many other forms of activity. The 
potential for emotional harm is greater than before. There is a risk that it may lead 
to self-harm or worse. The prospect is sufficiently worrying to justify extending 
the law. 
This suggests that the establishment of a criminal offence is crucial in carrying out 
Parliament’s objective. Therefore, the remainder of the inquiry under the “minimal 
impairment” limb will focus on whether the offence as it is currently drafted limits the 
right to freedom of expression no more than is reasonably necessary.  
  (ii)   Contextual considerations 
The offence set out in clause 19 is much broader in scope than the civil enforcement 
regime. A judge need not consider any extraneous circumstances outside the elements 
of the offence, being intention to cause harm, subjective harm to the victim and 
objective harm to the ordinary reasonable person. While clause 19(2) sets out a 
variety of factors a court may take into account in deciding whether a digital 
communication would be likely to cause harm, no other contextual factors must be 
considered. As a consequence, any type of speech that causes harm and would be 
expected to cause harm to a reasonable person could be included.  
The breadth of this offence means freedom of expression could be limited more than 
is reasonably necessary in order to address the harms discussed above. For example, 
in providing no safeguards for context, it is possible that political speech could fall 
within the offence where communications are so offensive to a politician so as to 
meet the serious emotional distress threshold. One submission to the select committee 
on this Bill offered the example of a person taking a photo of a politician receiving a 
bribe and, shocked at the politician’s corruption, posting it to the internet.153 It is 
almost certain that to have one’s corrupt activities exposed publically would cause 
serious emotional distress to the ordinary reasonable person in the position of the 
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victim. Therefore, if it can be shown that the communicator intended to cause harm to 
the politician, and harm actually did result, the communicator could be liable to 
imprisonment for up to 2 years under clause 19, despite the fact that the exposure of 
corrupt politicians may be of value to society. 154  The offence could also include 
artistic expression where it causes the required harm, or communications made about 
newsworthy incidents, such as a court case, or an accident or natural disaster, even 
where it may be in the public interest for these types of expression to be made. 
Enhanced specificity regarding how the offence will apply in a variety of contexts 
could be included in clause 19 in order to ensure the offence is not cast too wide.  
A possible amendment to ensure greater clarification would be to extend the 
application of the clause 6 communication principles, set out above in part III, to the 
criminal offence. These principles currently only apply to complaints under the civil 
enforcement regime, and a serious, repeated or threatened breach of one or more of 
the principles must occur before an order may be made by the court. The offence in 
clause 19 contains no such requirement, and the principles are not incorporated into 
the criminal law components of the Bill at all. If clause 19 also necessitated a breach 
of one or more of the clause 6 principles, the offence would then apply only to 
specific circumstances in which harmful digital communications were sent or 
posted.155 This addition would assist to ensure minimal interference with the right to 
freedom of expression.  
Another possible method to reduce the friction between freedom of expression and 
the aim of the offence would be to include in the provision a list of specific contexts 
in which the offence will not apply, such as when communications are political or 
artistic. In the Canadian case of Vancouver City v Zhang, the Court of Appeal found 
that a general prohibition on the erection of structures without the city’s prior consent 
was not constitutionally valid.156 In order for this provision to meet the “minimal 
impairment” limb under the Oakes test, it was found that a policy permitting the 
regulated use of a structure for political expression should have been included.157 
Using this reasoning, a list excluding certain contexts may be adequate to ensure the 
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reach of the offence impinges on freedom of expression to a lesser extent. Including 
such a list would also help in ensuring the offence is drafted with sufficient clarity. 
Having an offence that is adequately clear as to what behaviour it criminalises is of 
particular importance for the average New Zealander who has limited access to legal 
advice, but who uses digital communications regularly.158  
Both of these approaches have possible advantages and disadvantages. The 
inclusion of the communication principles in the offence would limit the context in 
which the offence may be breached, however, the principles would not make a 
significant difference to the offence in terms of speech that the law may wish to 
protect. Some of the principles are very general, such as principle 2, which states 
that a communication should not be threatening, intimidating or menacing. This 
principle could conceivably cover a wide range of communications, and does not 
limit the context beyond the harm requirements already set out in clause 19. A list 
of contexts in which the offence will not apply would go further in limiting the 
offence’s encroachment into freedom of expression. However, it is likely that a list 
of this kind goes rather too far, and may work to prevent the offence from 
achieving Parliament’s objective. While this approach may have the advantage of 
added certainty, it would limit the courts’ ability to inquire into whether the harm 
caused by a communication was so severe as to warrant criminalisation, regardless 
of the context in which it was made. The main objective of the offence is to address 
the harm caused in cases of seriously distressing digital communications.159 While 
there should be some mechanism empowering the District Court to declare that the 
public interest in allowing a communication to be made outweighs the harm 
caused, in order to properly fulfil Parliament’s objective it is important that the 
Court has some flexibility in the other direction also.   
 
In light of this, a preferable alternative may be to incorporate a general public interest 
element into the offence. In essence, public interest may be able to justify the 
communication of harmful speech, even where it meets the requirements under clause 
19. The inclusion of a public interest defence would give the court the discretion to 
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find that such communications should not be criminalised, despite the harm they may 
cause.  
 
An example of such a defence can be found in the Crimes Act 1961 at section 124, 
which criminalises the distribution or exhibition of indecent matter. Section 124(2) 
states: “It is a defence to a charge under this section to prove that the public good 
was served by the acts alleged to have been done.” 160 Another New Zealand 
example of a public interest defence in a criminal law context relates to the now 
repealed offence of criminal libel. The previous section 211 of the Crimes Act 1961 
stated “criminal libel is matter published without lawful justification or excuse, 
either designed to insult any person or likely to injure his reputation…”161 Section 
214 provided for a “plea of justification” for this offence, which said “every person 
accused of publishing a criminal libel may plead…(b) that it was for the public 
benefit that the matters charged should, if true, be published in the manner in which 
and at the time when they were published.”162  
 
These sections provide practical examples of a how a public interest defence could 
be incorporated into a communication-based offence. Clause 19 could contain a sub 
clause providing that, notwithstanding that the conduct amounts to a breach of 
section 19(1), it will be a defence if the defendant can prove that it was within the 
public interest that the digital communication was made. Under the rules of 
evidence, this defence element would have to be proved by the defendant on the 
balance of probabilities.163  
 
The inclusion of a public interest defence in clause 19 would be preferable to the 
enactment of the offence as it is currently drafted. Such a defence allows for some 
protection of expression that is in the public interest, but does not create rigid 
categories of speech excepted from the offence. The second question that must be 
asked under the minimal impairment inquiry is whether the inclusion of a public 
interest defence still allows for Parliament’s objective of preventing and deterring 
                                                        
160 Crimes Act 1961, s 124(2). 
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harmful digital communications to be achieved. It is my submission that a public 
interest defence would not prevent the offence from achieving Parliament’s purpose, 
as it would still allow for the criminalisation of gratuitously insulting communication. 
As the addition of a public interest defence still allows for Parliament’s objective to 
be achieved, it follows that the offence in its current form impairs the right to freedom 
of expression to a greater extent than is reasonably necessary. It therefore misses 
Tipping J’s target of discretion afforded to parliament. 
 
5  Balance of social advantage against harm to the right 
This limb of the test considers whether the benefits to society outweigh the harm done 
to an individual right or freedom.164 At the heart of this inquiry is the idea that “in 
each case, the loss to free speech ought not to be greater than the gain for the 
competing rights and interests served by the speech-limiting law.”165 Hanna Wilberg 
writes that one must balance, on one hand the importance of the right in the relevant 
context and the severity of the limit on that right, and on the other hand the 
importance of the objective and the effectiveness of the limit in serving the 
objective.166 
Freedom of expression is unarguably an important right in a free and democratic 
society,167 however not all speech is considered equal in terms of the value it holds.168 
In considering the importance of a particular type of expression, it is helpful to 
consider its value to determine the strength of protection that should be afforded 
speech of that value.169 Political speech is generally considered to be of the highest 
value, because it falls most clearly within the rationales justifying free speech 
discussed above.170 The types of speech that have commonly been considered to be of 
low value to society include pornography and obscenity, revelations of personal facts, 
and personal abuse unconnected to an important issue.171 Following this approach, 
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digital communications relating to political matters should be more carefully 
protected than speech containing personal insults with the purpose of causing 
emotional harm. Of course, where the line exists between the two may not always be 
clear, and distinguishing these types of speech from each other would be an important 
function of the Court in applying the provisions of the Harmful Digital 
Communications Bill. 
  (a)   Civil enforcement regime 
The civil enforcement regime confers an important benefit to society in that it exists 
to quickly address the harm caused by digital communications. By allowing the 
District Court to make various orders, the regime has the potential to be very effective 
in serving Parliament’s objective of preventing and mitigating that harm. As 
discussed in part IV above, protection of the type of speech targeted by the regime is 
not easily justified by the traditional rationales for freedom of expression. It is speech 
that can make victims feel powerless and unable to contribute to the marketplace of 
ideas, and it is not clearly justified under the self-fulfilment principle due to the harm 
it causes.  The factors a judge must consider before making an order under clause 
17(4) operate to ensure that political speech and other communications that are in the 
public interest are protected, and therefore the argument from democracy is not 
readily applicable to the speech being impacted. The clause 17 orders undoubtedly 
encroach on the right to freedom of expression. However, because they will work 
only to limit low value speech, the encroachment is not so significant as to outweigh 
the social benefit of the civil enforcement regime.  
  (b)   Criminal offence 
A criminal penalty is a substantial fetter on free speech – expressing condemnation of 
the action as a wrong against society.172 To criminalise some types of speech is to 
limit the right to freedom of expression significantly. The suggested maximum 
penalty for this offence was increased at the select committee stage from a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding 3 months to a term not exceeding 2 years. This is a 
severe consequence and will undoubtedly cause a chilling effect on online expression 
assuming the Bill is made law. However, as discussed above, the harm caused by 
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online abuse can be serious and long lasting for many victims, and the consequences 
can be tragic. Implementation of an effective method of preventing and deterring 
harmful digital communications is an important social objective. 
Although the creation of an offence has been satisfactorily justified, it is not clear that 
clause 19 impairs the right to freedom of expression only so far as is reasonably 
necessary. Whether the limitation it imposes on freedom of expression is unduly harsh 
will depend on how the law is applied. If the offence is used only to criminalise very 
harmful speech of the lowest value, such as personal insults or the posting of intimate 
photographs without consent, the limitation is likely to be justified. However, it is not 
clear that this is the only speech to which the offence will apply. The main issue with 
clause 19 is the lack of flexibility for the court in protecting harmful digital 
communications in certain contexts that do justify protection. The clause is not 
adequately specific as to which contextual factors may be relevant for 
criminalisation. 173  The substantial penalty for a breach of clause 19 means that 
discretion should be given to the court to find that a communication, although harmful 
in the way the act requires, is within the public interest, and should therefore not be 
criminalised. The inclusion of a public interest defence would be an appropriate way 
to ensure the benefit to society is not outweighed by the harm done to the right to 
freedom of expression. 
D Conclusion as to section 5 compliance 
 
1  Civil enforcement regime 
 
The civil enforcement regime does limit the right to freedom of expression. It allows 
the District Court to make a number of orders that infringe upon a communicator’s 
right to digitally send and upload harmful material.  This section has argued, however, 
that these orders are not so rights infringing as to be a disproportionate response to the 
harms being addressed. As there is no practical alternative to the civil enforcement 
regime that would allow for the objective of preventing and mitigating harm to be 
achieved, the regime is a demonstrably justified limitation under section 5 of the 
NZBORA. 
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2 Criminal offence 
 
While the creation of an offence to address egregious communication harms is 
justified, clause 19 is not specific enough regarding which contextual factors may 
render communications criminal. Therefore, the limit it places on freedom of 
expression is greater than reasonably necessary to achieve Parliament’s objective. In 
order to ensure communications that meaningfully serve the public interest are not 
criminalised, a public interest defence should be incorporated into clause 19. This 
would allow a judge to retain some discretion as to whether a communication 
contributes sufficient value to society to warrant protection, despite its harmful effects 
to a victim. As it currently stands, the social advantage the offence provides is 
outweighed by the harm is causes to the right to freedom of expression. 
 
VI Harmful Digital Communications Laws Enacted in Overseas 
Jurisdictions 
 
In an analysis of the appropriateness of proposed legislation, it is helpful to examine 
laws enacted in other jurisdictions in an attempt to remedy the same or similar harms. 
This section will consider laws addressing harmful digital communications in 
Australia, the United States of America and the United Kingdom in order to gain 
insight into how online abuse has been dealt with in similar but varying constitutional 
environments.  It will analyse whether any aspects of these foreign laws should be 
incorporated into the New Zealand Bill in order to make it more effective in achieving 
its objective. 
  
A Australia 
 
1 State law 
 
The only state-level legislation in Australia relevant to harmful digital 
communications is a specific cyber-bullying provision enacted in New South Wales. 
Under section 60E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), it is an offence where a person 
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‘assaults, stalks, harasses or intimidates’ any school staff or student while attending 
the school. 174   None of the terms ‘assault’, ‘stalk’, ‘harass’ or ‘intimidate’ are 
specifically defined, but on their natural meaning would include cyber-bullying.175 
 
This section aims to prevent bullying, but is limited in its inclusion of only staff and 
students while ‘attending the school’, which is defined in s 60D(2) as follows: 
(a) while the student or member of staff is on school premises for the 
purposes of school work or duty (even if not engaged in school work 
or duty at the time), or  
(b)  while the student or member of staff is on school premises for the 
purposes of before school or after school child care, or  
(c)  while entering or leaving school premises in connection with school 
work or duty or before school or after school care.  
 
This limitation is significant, because it prevents the offence from including cyber-
bullying that occurs while the target is anywhere other than on school premises.176  
While this section may go some way towards deterring students from bullying, it is 
not broad enough to truly target the harm that cyber-bullying causes due to its 
invasive reach into the homes of victims. 
 
 (a)   New Zealand considerations 
 
Legislation criminalising only conduct occurring on school premises is not adequate 
to address the concerns set out by the New Zealand Law Commission. A very narrow 
approach of this kind would not be a suitable option for New Zealand to pursue in its 
attempt to reduce harmful digital communications, as the ministerial briefing paper 
demonstrated the wide reach of online abuse to people of all ages and in all stages of 
life. 
 
2 Federal law 
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Australia currently has no federal law enacted specifically to target cyber-bullying, 
however under section 474.17 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995, it is an 
offence to use a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence.177 The maximum 
penalty for this offence is 3 years imprisonment.178 While the requirement that a 
carriage service be used to “cause offence” potentially sets a relatively low threshold, 
this offence has been interpreted as only applying to severe cases of offensiveness. 
The most widely known case in which this offence has been applied is that of Bradley 
Hampson,.179 Hampson, posted a number of objectionable and sexualized comments 
on Facebook pages created as tributes to two Queensland children who had been 
murdered. Among other things, Hampson posted digitally altered photographs of the 
children placing them in sexual contexts. In one photo, Hampson is said to have 
posted a photograph of one victim with a penis drawn near her mouth alongside 
messages including “Woot I’m Dead” and “Had It Coming.”180 Judge Kerry O’Brien 
described Hampson’s actions as “depraved”, and sentenced him to 3 years in prison, 
but ordered he be released after 12 months.181 
 
The offence was also found to apply in the case of Crowther v Sala.182 Mrs Crowther 
had been in a long-running dispute with the State of Queensland regarding air 
pollution near her home. 183  The dispute escalated until Mrs Crowther eventually 
called an employee at the Department of Employment and Training and, using 
explicit language, claimed that she would shoot everyone at the Department.184 Mrs 
Crowther’s submission that the statements were merely “hyperbole” and “Australian 
colloquialisms” that would not be taken to be menacing by the ordinary listener were 
rejected by the Queensland Court of Appeal, which found that the offence was indeed 
made out.185 
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An example of where this offence was found not to apply was in the case of Danziel 
McNamara, who sent 15 text messages over two weeks to a former friend. These texts 
contained various derogatory comments, including calling the victim a “fat loser”. A 
judge in an Ipswich Magistrates Court in 2010 found that 47 year old McNamara 
should not be convicted under section 474.17. Despite the judge describing the 
messages as “nasty stuff”, he ultimately found that the case was not serious enough in 
comparison with others charged under the offence to warrant a conviction.186   
 
(a)   Proposed amendments 
 
On 22 January 2014, the Australian Department of Communications released a 
discussion paper to assist in providing advice to the Government to enhance online 
safety for children.187 This discussion paper sets out a number of possible measures 
the Government may take to help combat cyber-bullying in Australia, drawing 
heavily from New Zealand’s Harmful Digital Communications Bill in its suggestions.  
 
The Department of Communications looked at existing Commonwealth legislation to 
determine how best to achieve the Government’s objectives. It found that, while laws 
such as section 474.17 may already cover cyber-bullying in practice, the language of 
this provision may be difficult for young people to understand. Specifically, the paper 
found that most people would be unlikely to know what the term ‘carriage service’ 
means. 188  The discussion paper considered three possible approaches to this 
accessibility problem. Firstly, it suggested raising awareness of the existence of these 
offences and their meanings through education about the current law.189 Secondly, it 
considered whether a separate cyber-bullying offence covering only wrongdoing 
involving minors could be enacted to sit alongside section 474.17.190 Further, the 
report considered whether lesser penalties, including counseling, restorative justice, 
and community-based orders would be suitable for such an offence. Thirdly, the paper 
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suggested the creation of a separate civil enforcement regime to deal with cyber-
bullying modeled on the New Zealand ‘approved agency’ approach.191 The discussion 
paper cited New Zealand’s proposed establishment of an approved agency as an 
example of an accessible and centralised point of contact to deal with online safety.192 
 
(b)   New Zealand considerations 
 
A number of the law changes suggested in the Australian Department of 
Communications’ report closely resemble the civil enforcement regime set out in 
Harmful Digital Communications Bill, albeit with a few modifications. One 
significant difference discussed above is the suggestion that a new offence be enacted 
to sit alongside the current section 474.17, which would be applicable only to minors. 
This is an interesting approach to the question of how best to criminalise harmful 
digital communications involving young people. It may be that establishing different 
types of penalties depending on the age of the offender is an appropriate method to 
consider in the New Zealand context. In terms of what the Harmful Digital 
Communications Bill is aiming to achieve with the criminal offence, however, this 
may not be suitable. Parliament’s intention is to reduce instances of serious harm. 
Cyber-bullying amongst adolescents is the most prevalent type of harmful digital 
communications. Establishing a separate, lesser offence for adolescents will decrease 
the deterrent effect criminalisation aims to have. The age of the offender will be taken 
into account at sentencing stage, at which time restorative justice will also be 
available in New Zealand.193 While establishing a separate offence for minors would 
decrease the limitation on freedom of expression currently posed by clause 19, the 
detrimental effect it would have on the ability of the offence to achieve Parliament’s 
objective outweighs the freedom of expression benefit. 
 
B United States of America 
 
1 State law 
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Anti-bullying laws have been enacted in every American state with the exception of 
Montana.194 Unlike the New Zealand Bill, most of these laws only target instances of 
minors bullying other minors, and do not include harmful digital communications 
made between adults.195 The majority of these states have specifically included the 
terms “cyber-bullying” or “digital harassment” in their bullying legislation, to ensure 
that this type of bullying is caught within the provisions.196 Without exception, each 
of these state-level bullying laws requires schools to put in place an anti-bullying 
policy.197 While 44 of the states include a school sanction in their laws, only 14 of 
these laws allow for a criminal sanction.198  
 
At least one of these laws containing a criminal sanction has come under scrutiny for 
its constitutionality. In Albany, New York, a statute defined cyber-bullying as 
electronic acts amounting to: 199   “taunting; threatening; intimidating; insulting; 
tormenting; humiliating; disseminating embarrassing or sexually explicit photographs; 
disseminating private, personal, false or sexual information; or sending hate mail” 
where there was an intention to “harass, annoy, threaten, abuse, taunt, intimidate, 
torment, humiliate, or otherwise inflict significant emotional harm on another 
person.” Under this Act, knowingly engaging in this behaviour was punishable by up 
to a year in jail or a $1000 fine.200 
 
In the New York State Court of Appeal, the first person charged under this offence, 
15 year old Marquan Mackey-Meggs, argued the cyber-bullying law 
unconstitutional.201 The Court found that the statute was poorly drafted, which led to 
it being overbroad and vague. Because of this, the Court ruled the legislation breached 
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the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment, and was therefore invalid.202 It is 
important to note that this decision does not amount to confirmation that cyber-
bullying legislation is wholly unconstitutional in the United States. Rather, it supports 
the proposition that precise drafting is necessary to avoid a breach of the First 
Amendment. The Court stated:203  
 
Cyberbullying is not conceptually immune from government regulation, so we may 
assume, for the purposes of this case, that the First Amendment permits the 
prohibition of cyberbullying directed at children, depending on how that activity is 
defined. 
 
 (a)   New Zealand considerations 
 
As with the NSW cyber-bullying law, American state level laws address only the 
harms caused by cyber-bullying occurring between minors. Aligned with the 
objective of limiting such harms, each of the anti-bullying laws enacted by state 
legislatures requires schools to put an anti-bullying policy in place. This approach 
does not accord with the aims of the New Zealand Law Commission, which stated in 
their ministerial briefing paper that the new laws proposed are intended to apply to all 
people of ages, and no specific provisions aimed at school involvement are included. 
New Zealand’s Education Act 1989 does in fact already require schools to provide a 
safe physical and emotional environment for the children in the school’s care, which 
would include having systems in place to prevent bullying of any kind. 204  The 
Harmful Digital Communications Bill intends to target the harm caused to victims of 
any age, and does not delve into the issue of schools’ bullying policies, so is 
fundamentally different from the focus of the various cyber-bullying laws enacted in 
the American states. 
 
The New York law declared unconstitutional by the New York State Court of Appeal 
sets out a threshold for harm that is significantly lower than the Harmful Digital 
Communications Bill’s requirement of serious emotional distress. In a New Zealand 
                                                        
202 The People v Marquan M, above n 201 at [15]. 
203 The People v Marquan M, above n 201 at [8]. 
204 Education Act 1989, s 60A(1)(c).  
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context, it is unlikely that a provision of this kind would be passed due to the 
NZBORA section 7 requirement that the Attorney-General shall, when a Bill is 
introduced to the House, bring to the House’s attention any provision which appears 
to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in NZBORA.205 The 
excessive breadth of the provision recognised by the New York State Court of Appeal 
would almost certainly be identified by the Attorney General as constituting an 
unjustified limitation on the right to freedom of expression. It would therefore be 
unlikely to be passed into law without an amendment to the threshold of harm.206  
 
2 Federal law 
 
Despite state participation in establishing cyber-bullying laws, there is currently no 
law addressing harmful digital communication in the United States at a federal level. 
While the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act (the Megan Meier Act)207 was 
introduced in Congress in April 2009, it was never enacted. The Megan Meier Act 
was proposed to amend the federal criminal code to “impose criminal penalties on 
anyone who transmits in interstate or foreign commerce a communication intended to 
coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to another person, 
using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior.”208 Upon 
introduction, members of Congress dismissed the legislation as “an unconstitutional 
breach of free speech” and “another chapter of over-criminalization.”209 Due to these 
concerns over the bill’s limitation on the First Amendment right to freedom of 
expression, the bill never reached a vote.210 
 
 (a)   New Zealand considerations 
 
                                                        
205 Bill of Rights Act, above n 73, s 7. 
206 For discussion on the effect of s 7 on Parliament’s protection of the rights embodied in the 
NZBORA see Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand’s Constitution and 
Government (4th ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004) at 236. 
207 Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act H.R.1966. This Act was drafted in response to the 
cyber-bullying that led to the 2006 suicide of 13-year-old Megan Meier of Missouri. 
208 Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act above n 208. 
209 David Kravets “Cyberbullying Bill Gets Chilly Reception” (30 September 2009) 
<http://www.wired.com>. 
210 Benjamin Walther, above n 26, at 536. 
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The United States’ constitutional environment generally gives the government “no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its 
content,” 211  because of the primacy given to the First Amendment right to free 
speech.212 New Zealand, however, has not enacted a supreme constitution, and rights 
can be subject to certain justified limitations under section 5 of the NZBORA.213 
Therefore, legislation that is deemed unconstitutional in the United States may appear 
to be much more acceptable in New Zealand. This is not the case with the Megan 
Meier Act, however. The provision only contained a requirement of intention on the 
part of the communicator, with no reference to harm caused to the victim, either 
subjective or objective. The provision would not satisfy the section 5 test for this 
reason. By omitting any harm requirements, the offence would allow too many 
instances of digital communications to be criminalised. The chilling effect this 
provision would have on freedom of expression is significant. As with the provision 
enacted in New York discussed above, the offence set out in clause 19 of the Harmful 
Digital Communications Bill is preferable to legislation of this kind, as intention 
alone is not sufficient to ensure that only the most serious digital harms are 
criminalised.  
 
C United Kingdom 
 
In the United Kingdom, harmful digital communications are targeted through two 
different statutes. The first is the Malicious Communications Act 1988. Section 1 
applies where a person sends an electronic communication to another that is indecent 
or grossly offensive, conveys a threat, or which is false, provided there is an intention 
to cause distress or anxiety to the recipient. 214  The terms “indecent or grossly 
offensive” were said to be ordinary English words in the case of Connolly v DPP.215 
As Lord Bingham made clear in DPP v Collins, “(t)here can be no yardstick of gross 
offensiveness otherwise than by the application of reasonably enlightened, but not 
                                                        
211 United States v Stevens, 559 US 460 at 5. 
212 United States v Stevens, above n 211 at 5. 
213 For a comparison of various countries bills of rights see Grant Huscroft “Rights, Bills of Rights and 
the Role of Courts and Legislatures” in Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestice and 
International Law ed Grant Hushcroft and Paul Rishworth (2002, Hart Publishing, Oxford, Portland 
Oregon). 
214 Malicious Communications Act 1998 (UK), s 1. 
215 Connolly v DPP [2007] 1 ALL ER 1012 at [10].  
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perfectionist, contemporary standards to the particular message sent in its particular 
context”.216  
 
The second is the Communications Act 2003. Section 127 can also be used to apply to 
instances of cyber-bullying.217 This provision makes it an offence to send or cause to 
be sent through a “public electronic communications network“ a message or other 
matter that is “grossly offensive” or of an “indecent, obscene or menacing character”. 
The same section also states that it is an offence to send or cause to be sent a false 
message “for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to 
another.” This requires that the defendant either intended or was aware that the 
message was grossly offensive, indecent or menacing, which can be inferred from the 
circumstances. There is no actual harm requirement, and the intended recipient need 
not be offended by or even in fact receive the message. 218 
 
In the case of Chambers v DPP, it was argued that a publically viewable message sent 
on the social networking platform “Twitter” could not be included under section 127 
because, as a privately owned company, Twitter did not constitute a  “public 
communications network”. 219  The High Court disagreed, finding because Twitter 
could not be operated without use of the internet, which it found is a public 
communications network, the fact of Twitter’s private ownership was irrelevant.220 
Accordingly, the Court found that messages sent using Twitter do fall within the 
ambit of section 127.221 Because many communications sent via social media are 
similarly accessible only to those who have access to the internet, the same 
presumably applies to any such communications.  
 
1 New Zealand Considerations 
 
The relevant legislation in the United Kingdom differs from clause 19 of the Harmful 
Digital Communications Bill in a number of material ways. There is no subjective 
                                                        
216 DPP v Collins [2006] UKHL 40 at [9] per Lord Bingham.  
217 Communications Act 2003 (UK), s 127. 
218 DPP v Collins, above n 216 at [25] per Lord Brown. 
219Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157 at [21]. 
220 At [23]. 
221 At [25]. 
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harm element in either section 1 or section 127, and only section 127 requires 
intention on the part of the communicator.  While the test does require some objective 
harm, the standards of grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or menacing have the 
potential to be significantly broader than the “serious emotional distress” requirement 
set out in the Bill. As with the United States proposed legislation, the effect of these 
variations is that the limitation the provisions impose on the right to freedom of 
expression is greater than in the Harmful Digital Communications Bill, because it will 
be capable of applying to a great number of situations.  
 
There also appears to be significant overlap in the two offences. This was most likely 
not foreseen when the Communications Act was enacted in 2003, as social media was 
not yet the influential forum for communication it has since become. The inclusion of 
Twitter in the interpretation of “public communications network” has created 
uncertainty as to how much further this may extend. 222  By drafting more clearly 
defined legislation with modern technological advances in mind, the Harmful Digital 
Communications Bill is more suitable to address the concerns set out in the Law 
Commission’s ministerial briefing paper. 
 
D  Conclusion as to Foreign Jurisdictions 
 
The Harmful Digital Communications Bill would not be improved if it were to 
incorporate aspects of the laws discussed above. The Australian Department of 
Communications’ suggestion for a separate offence for youth offenders is potentially 
useful in limiting clause 19’s intrusion into freedom of expression. However, it goes 
too far in restricting the offence’s ability to achieve Parliament’s objective of 
preventing harmful digital communications. This is due to the prevalence of 
adolescent cyber-bullying, which the Law Commission highlighted as a major 
concern. 223  Both the Australian and American state level legislation is overly 
restrictive in its exclusion of harmful digital communications between adults. Further, 
the harm required in the New York cyber-bullying law is too wide to amount to a 
demonstrably justified limitation on freedom of expression in New Zealand. In terms 
of freedom of expression, the Harmful Digital Communications Bill is also superior in 
                                                        
222 Allisdair A Gillespie “Twitter, Jokes and the Law” (2012) 76 J Crim L 364 at 368. 
223 Harmful Digital Communications, above n 9, at [2.28]. 
  52 
its inclusion of intention as well as both subjective and objective requirements under 
the criminal offence. This is in contrast with the Megan Meier Act and both United 
Kingdom provisions. The Harmful Digital Communications Bill is similarly 
preferable due to its inclusion of a civil enforcement regime, which provides a vehicle 
to address the actual harm caused rather than simply penalising offenders who cause 
it.  
 
VII Conclusion  
 
This paper has examined the serious consequences of harmful digital communications 
and cyber-bullying, and the inability of the current law to address the harm caused. 
The Law Commission attempted to remedy this inadequacy by proposing a number of 
new laws aimed at preventing and mitigating the harm caused by harmful digital 
communications. Among these suggestions were the establishment of a new civil 
enforcement regime and the creation of a criminal offence of causing harm by posting 
a digital communication, both of which were included in the resulting Harmful Digital 
Communications Bill. These two areas of the Bill were the focus of this paper, which 
considered their compatibility with the NZBORA, given the restriction they place on 
the right to freedom of expression. 
 
In order to examine this limitation in a theoretical sense, the paper first considered 
whether harmful digital communications are defensible under the underlying 
rationales of freedom of expression. While the rationales of discovery of truth, self-
fulfilment and participation in democracy are capable of justifying the right to free 
political speech, they do not provide a convincing argument for the absolute 
protection of harmful digital communications and cyber-bullying.  
 
This paper also considered in some depth the Bill’s limitation on freedom of 
expression in light of the legal requirement of demonstrable justification under section 
5 of the NZBORA. This discussion revealed that, while the civil enforcement regime 
represents a justified limitation on the right to freedom of expression, the offence of 
causing harm by posting a digital communication does not. Upon undertaking a 
section 5 analysis of clause 19, it became apparent that the offence represents a limit 
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that is greater than reasonably necessary to achieve Parliament’s objective. This is 
because the wording of the offence is broad enough to cover speech that, although 
harmful to a particular person, is of significant public utility. The paper proposed that 
the offence be amended to include a public interest defence. This would allow the 
Court discretion to refrain from criminalising harmful digital expression where it is in 
the public interest to do so. The inclusion of a public interest defence would allow 
Parliament’s objective to be achieved at a lower cost to the right to freedom of 
expression.  
 
Finally, the paper looked at laws enacted in other jurisdictions aimed at achieving a 
similar objective to the Harmful Digital Communications Bill. It concluded that the 
Bill provides the most appropriate framework for New Zealand to address the unique 
harms identified in the Law Commission’s ministerial briefing paper on the topic. 
Despite this, the current Bill should not be passed without amendments.  The most 
pressing concern is the inclusion of a public interest defence to the criminal offence at 
clause 19. This should be achieved by way of a supplementary order paper at the time 
at which the paper has its second reading. In order for this offence to meet the 
requirement set out in section 5 of the NZBORA, a public interest defence is essential 
to prevent the offence from having an overly chilling effect on the right to freedom of 
expression.  
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